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Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg 
Campaign. 

By colonel JOHN S. MOSBY. 



A REVIEW 



BY 



T. M. R. TALCOTT, 

Major and Aide-de-Camp to General R. E. Lee, 1862 and 1863, and later 
Colonel ist Regiment Engineer Troops, A. N. V. 



Reprint fkom Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XXXVII, 



RICHMOND: 

WM. ELLIS JONES, BOOK AND JOB PRINTER. 
1909. 



Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg 
Campaign. 

By colonel JOHN S. MOSBY. 



A REVIE\\^ 



BY 



T. M. R. TALCOTT, 

V 

Major and Aide-de-Camp to General R. E. Lee, 1862 and 1S63, and later 
Colonel 1st Regiment Engineer Troops, A. N. V. 



Reprint from Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XXXVII. 



RICHMOND: 

WM. ELLIS JONES, BOOK AND JOB PRINTER. 
1909. 






am 

Author 

(Person) 

APr. . sio 



STUART'S CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG 
CAMPAIGN. 



By Col. John S. Mosby. 



A Review by COL. T. M. R. TALCOTT. 



After reading Col. Alosby's book, which I had not seen until 
recently, I asked Col. Walter H. Taylor whether" he had made 
any reply to it^ and received the following letter from him : 

"Norfolk, Va., March 12th, 1909. 
Colonel T. AI. R. Talcott, Richmond, Va. 

Dear Colonel, — I have received your letter of the loth 
inst. I read what Mosby had to say about Gettysburg some 
time ago. I did not attach much importance to his statements 
and did not publish, neither have I any intention to publish, any- 
thing in reply. I think some of the partisans of General Stuart 
have done him more harm than good in their contributions con- 
cerning army movements in the Gettysburg Campaign. 

What I have claimed is simply this : Although certain dis- 
cretion was allowed General Stuart as to his movements, he 
was admonished all the while to keep in touch with our main 
army and to keep General Lee informed as to the movements 
of the enemy. Secondly : that General Lee was greatly disturbed 
and embarrassed at not receiving any tidings from General 
Stuart concerning the movements of the enemy. 

Some of General Stuart's defenders have claimed that he sim- 
ply exercised the discretion allowed him when he crossed the 
Potomac where he did and pursued the route that he did ; and 
that it was impossible for him to keep General Lee informed 
of the movements of himself and the enemy because the enemy 
intervened between him and General Lee. It is not a good de- 
fense of General Stuart to say that it was impossible for him 
to communicate with General Lee when he had himself put him- 
self in a position where it was impossible, although admonished 



all the while not to do this. In a few words, it seems to me that 
this describes impartially just how far General Stuart was to be 
blamed. * * * 

Yours very truly, 

(Signed) W. H. Taylor. 

In the preface of his book, Col. ]\Iosby says : 

"These pages have been written as a duty I owe to a soldier 
to whom great injustice has been done. The statements in the 
two reports of the commanding general in regard to his orders 
and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign 
have been generally accepted without question; and the criti- 
cisms of his staff officers and biographers on the conduct of the 
Chief of Cavalry have assumed them to be true. * * I have 
tried to explain how his name is signed to papers that do so 
much injustice as well to himself as to General Stuart." 

In a note on page 203, Col. JMosby says : 

"My criticism of General Lee's report, which I believe he 
signed without reading, does not imply any criticism of him as 
a general. * ''' "^^ '^ It is doubtful if he ever read it, or if it was 
even read to him." 

On page 209 he further says : 

"The report is understood to have been written by a staff 
officer. * '^ * It is unfair to Stuart as it says nothing about Ewell 
having gone several days in advance into Pennsylvania ; and that 
Stuart was ordered to join him with three brigades of cavalry — 
or that Stuart had authority to cross the Potomac in Hooker's 
rear — or that he left two brigades of calvary with Longstreet 
and General Lee." 

As regards Col. Mosby's belief that General Lee signed his 
reports without reading them, or even having them read to him, 
Col. W. H. Taylor, whose attention I called to Col. iMosby's 
note on page 203, of his book, has this to say: 

"In reference to Colonel ^losby's note on page 203 of his 
book, you and I know that General Lee never sent a formal bat- 
tle report to the Department that was not carefully revised be- 



fore he signed it ; and Col. ]\Iosby's gratuitous assertion that the 
report of Gettysburg was signed without being read, and his 
doubt if General Lee ever read it, or if it was even read to him, 
is a bald assumption on his part, contrary to the evidence of 
those who were present and know the manner employed and the 
care exercised in the preparation of all of his reports." 

My own observation, as a member of his staff, of General 
Lee's preparation of official documents was not as frequent or 
for so long a period as that of his Adjutant General ; but even 
without this emphatic statement from Col. Taylor, I cannot for 
one moment entertain the suggestion made by Col. Mosby that 
General Lee signed his official reports of the battle of Gettysburg 
without reading them, or having them read to him. 

Col. Mosby says that General Lee's report is unfair to Stuart 
because it says nothing about Ewell having gone several days 
in advance into Pennsylvania. It was not that Ewell advanced 
ahead of time, but that Stuart was two days behind time in 
crossing the Potomac, which permitted the Federal army to in- 
tervene between his command and that of Ewell ; so that after 
crossing the Potomac, instead of going west to Fredericktown, 
Md., as indicated by General Lee, Stuart was forced to move 
northward through Westminster to Carlisle, Penn., in order to 
effect a junction with Ewell at that point. 

Col. JMosby is mistaken in saying that General Lee's report 
made no mention of the fact that Stuart had authority to cross 
the Potomac in Hooker's rear, as will be seen by reference to 
the extracts from the reports, hereinafter quoted. 

Col. Mosby 's statement that General Lee's report is unfair to 
Stuart, in that it says nothing about Stuart's having "left two 
brigades with Longstreet and Lee," is in support of his con- 
tention, in defense of Stuart, that Lee had sufficient cavalry to 
keep him informed of the enemy's movements during Stuart's 
absence. The two brigades referred to were by General Lee's 
instructions to Stuart, left in Virginia, to watch the flank and 
rear of the army until the enemy retired from their front, then 
picket the passes of the Blue Ridge and close upon the rear of 
the army ; but it Avas not until after the enemy was in Maryland 
and the order to follow had been repeated, that they crossed the 



Potomac and joined General Lee. It cannot, therefore, be prop- 
erly said that Lee had these two brigades of cavalry available to 
mask his movements and keep him informed of the enemy's 
movements during the absence of Stuart. If they were not 
available because of failure to obey orders, Stuart must have 
erred in the selection of the ofihcer whose duty it was to carrv 
them ouL. 

To facilitate comparison of the two reports, in so far as they 
relate to the cavalry, the following extracts from them are given 
in alternate quotations from each report, under nine different 
headings, as follows : 

(i) Cavalry ivas directed to hold the mountain passes until the 

enemy erossed the Potomac. 

First Report : 

General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains 
and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was in- 
structed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he at- 
tempt to cross the Potomac. 

Second Report : 

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes Avith 
part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the 
Potomac. 

(2) //" the enemy attempted to cross the Potomac a part of the 

cavalry z^'as to cross into Maryland. 

First Report : 

In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Mary- 
land. 

Second Report : 

And with the remainder to cross into Maryland. 

(3) Discretion as to his crossing the Potomac east or zcest of 
the Blue Ridge zcas given at the suggestion of Stuart. 

First Report: 
Crossing the Potomac east or west of the r)lue Ridge as in 
his judgment should be best. 

Second Report : 
Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage 



the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his 
rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion 
whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. 

(4) After crossing the Potomac Stuart zvas to tal-e position on 

the right of the advancing column. 
First Report : 
And take position on the right of our column as it advanced. 

Second Report : 
But he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command 
on the right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy 
moving northward. 

(5) When Longstreet and Hill zvere encamping near Chamhers- 
burg June 2'jth, nothing had been heard from Stuart. 

First Report: 
By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that 
the rest of the army should be in supporting distance, and Long- 
street and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed 
at Williamsport, and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns 
reunited at Hagerstovvn, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, 
encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th. No report had been 
received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and 
the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain ac- 
curate information. 

Second Report : 

It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross 
the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its move- 
ments, and nothing having been heard from him since our en- 
trance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not left 
Virginia. 

(6) By the route Stuart pursue! the Federal army zvas inter- 

posed bctzveen his command and our main body. 
First Report: 
General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Fed- 
eral army south of the Potomac, after our own had entered 
Maryland, and in his efforts to impede its progress advanced as 
far as Fairfax Court House. Finding himself unable to delay the 



enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca and marched 
throiig-h Westminister to Carlisle, where he arrived after Gen- 
eral Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued the 
Federal army was interposed between his command and our 
main body, preventing any communication with him until he ar- 
rived at Carlisle. 

Second Report : 

(Nothing). 

(7) The inarch tozi'ards Gettysburg zvas slozver than it zcould 
have been if the moz'cuieuts of the Federal arniy had been 
kiiozvn. 

First Report : 

The march towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly 
than it would have been if the movements of the Federal army 
had been known. 

Second Report: 

General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and directed to join 
the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might 
require. The adance of the enemy to the latter place was un- 
known, and the weather being inclement the march was con- 
ducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. 

(8) Intelligence of Stuart's arrival at Carlisle zi'as received on 

July ist, after Hill had met the enemy. 

First Report : 

The leading division of General Hill met the enemy in advance' 
of Gettysburg on the morning of July ist. During the afternoon 
intelligence was received of the arri'val of General Stuart at 
Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg and take 
position on our left. 

Second Report : 

(Nothing). 

(9) Jones and Robertson z^'cre ordered to join the army as soon 

as it Zi.'as knozoi that the enemy zcas in Maryland. 

First Report : 
(Nothing). 



Second Report : 

As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into 
Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robertson and 
Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Bine Ridge, 
to join the army without delay, and it was expected that Gen- 
eral Stuart with the remainder of his command would soon 
arrive. 

These are in substance all of the statements in General Lee's 
two reports "in regard to his orders and the management of the 
cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign," which Mosby says, "have 
been generally accepted without question," but which he does 
not believe General Lee is responsible for, although they appear 
over his signature. He thinks the advance of Longstreet and 
Hill on the 24th was premature and resulted disastrously ; he 
claims that Stuart was carrying out orders of General Lee when 
he moved directly to Carlisle after crossing the Potomac at Seneca 
(probably through failure to give due weight to General Lee's 
letter of the 23rd) ; and he endeavors to show that General Hill 
was responsible for the miscarriage of General Lee's plans ; and 
that the scout's report and Ewell's recall were not as stated, but 
if he has made any specific denial of the above statements of 
General Lee "in regard to his orders and the management of 
the cavalry in the Gettysburg compaign," it has escaped my at- 
tention. 

General Lee says in his first report: "No report had been re- 
ceived that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the 
absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate 
information." Mosby says in answer to this that the cavalry, 
with Stuart, was not needed to obtain information of the enemy's 
movements, and that it was better employed elsewhere. 

In his second report, General Lee says : "General Stuart was 
directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command 
(i. e., Robertson's and Jones' brigades), as long as the enemy 
remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder (three 
brigades), to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right 
of General Ewell. L^pon the suggestion of the former officer 
(Stuart), that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage 
of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do 



10 

so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland 
east or west of the Blue Ridge ; but he was instructed to lose no 
time in placing his command on the right of our column as 
soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward. * * It was ex- 
pected' that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac 
General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing 
having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, 
it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. " Mosby 
says (pages 179 and 180), ''he could not have expected Stuart 
to communicate with him while he was executing the movement, 
simply because Stuart was too far away and the Blue Ridge and 
Hooker's army was between them." This is a denial of what 
General Lee says he expected of Stuart, and is justified only by 
Mosby "s assumption that Stuart was acting under General Lee's 
orders in moving directly to Carlisle. 

Whether or not General Lee had a right to expect that Gen- 
eral Stuart would promptly take position on Ewell's right, and 
keep him informed as to the movements of the enemy, either 
directly or through General Ewell, must be determined by the 
instructions General Stuart had received from General Lee. Col. 
Mosby himself says (page 214), "The gravamen of the com- 
plaint the report makes against Stuart is that the cavalry was 
absent and that it was needed, not in the battle, but to make 
preliminary reconnaissances before the battle." 

Lee's Instruction to Stuart. 

Col. Mosby says (page 'J2), that General Stuart rode to see 
General Lee on the night of June 21st, but there is no record 
of what passed between them at that meeting. The next day 
(June 22), General Lee wrote to General Stuart as follows 
(page 89) : 

"I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning, to Gen- 
eral Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were 
to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps 
he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? 
I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac 
before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward 
and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care 



11 

of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland 
and take position on General Evvell's right, place yourself in 
communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of 
the enemy's movements and collect all the supplies you can for 
the use of the army. One column of General Evvell's army 
will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitts- 
burg route, another by Chambersburg. Accounts from last night 
state there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force 
(about lOo), guarded the Monocracy bridge, which was barri- 
caded. You will of course take charge of Jenkins' brigade and 
give necessary instructions." 

On the same day (June 22), General Lee wrote to General 
Ewell. as follows: "I directed General Stuart, should the enemy 
have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure 
of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across 
the Potomac and place himself on your right and in communica- 
tion with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy 
and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard 
from him since." 

Col. Mosby says (page 88), that this letter "settles a ques- 
tion that has been raised whether Stuart's instructions required 
him to remain in Virginia and march north on the right flank 
of the two corps that were with Lee, or to move into Pennsyl- 
vania and join Ewell on the Susquehanna." It merely advised 
General Ewell, who had been authorized to move tozcards the 
Sitsqucliaiuia, that Stuart would be on his right and in communi- 
cation with him during his march, and not after he reached the 
Susquehanna. 

When on June 22nd, Ewell was authorized to move towards 
the Susquehanna he was in Maryland, "opposite Shepherds- 
town," and Anderson's division of Hill's corps was to be at 
Shepherdstown the next day — ^which would relieve Early's di- 
vision and enable Ewell to move his whole corps into Pennsyl- 
vania, with Jenkins' cavalry in advance and Imboden on his left. 
If Hooker was moving northward, Stuart was to cross the 
Potomac with three brigades of his cavalry, "take position on 
Swell's right, place himself in communication with him, guard 
his flanks," etc., and he was also to "take charge of Jenkins' bri- 



12 

gacle." The other divisions of Hill's corps were advancing to the 
Potomac at Shepherdstown. Longstreet had been withdrawn 
from the Ashby's and Snicker's Gap Roads, west of the Shenan- 
doah, and was to follow the next day. The first and third corps 
were moving to follow Ewell's advance when General Lee wrote 
to General Stuart on the 22nd, and asked : "Do you know where 
he (Hooker) is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a. 
march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware." 
Col. ]\Iosby says (page 91), that General Stuart received an- 
other letter from General Lee, which differed from the first (of 
June 22), "in suggesting to Stuart to cross the Potomac in 
Hooker's rear." He quotes from this letter of June 23rd, but 
does not give it in full. According to the official records, it was 
as follows : 

"Headquarters, Army of X'orthern A'irginia, 

June 23, 1863, 3:30 P. M., 
]\L\jor-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry. 

General, — Your notes of 9 and 10:30 A. M. today have 
just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your 
men, supposing that Confederate money will be taken, I am 
willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase 
this tobacco and let the men get it from them. 

If (jeneral Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two 
brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but 
should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had 
better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross 
at Shei)herdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. 

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass 
around their army without hindrance, doing them all the dam- 
age you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In 
either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and 
feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provis- 
ions, etc. 

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left be- 
liind. to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event 
of the enemy leaving their front), retire from the mountains 
west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the 



13 

passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing 
upon the rear of the army. 

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy 
moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades must 
do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you 
cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better. 

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former 
letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac today, and 
Longstreet will follow tomorrow. 

Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. 

I am very respectfully and truly yours, 

(Signed), R. E. Lee, 

General." 

The letter of the 23rd was written by General Lee after re- 
ceiving two notes from General Stuart, which no doubt stated 
in reply to his letter of the 22nd that General Hooker's army 
was still inactive, although jMosby did not so report to General 
Stuart until the next day. In it General Lee tells Stuart that 
Longstreet and Hill are moving to the Potomac ; and Stuart chose 
the route via Seneca, with full knowledge that they were fol- 
lowing Ewell. 

According to the first order, Stuart was to cross the Potomac 
if Hooker's army was moving northward, and according to the 
second order he was to do so even if Hooker's army remained 
inactive. In his last order General Lee suggested that he cross 
the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge mountains "and move over 
to Fredericktown," which would place him on the right of Ewell ; 
but discretion was allowed Stuart to cross east of the mountains 
if he could do so zvithout hindrance. In either case, after cross- 
ing the Potomac, "he must feel the right of Ewell's troops, 
collecting information, provisions, etc." He was to be with Ewell 
on the march tozvards the Susquehanna and not merely to join 
him "on the Susquehanna." 

Of the movements of Longstreet and Hill while Hooker was 
still lying quiet south of the river, of which Stuart was advised 
as above stated. Col. Alosby says (page 103) : 



14 

"This premature movement of Longstreet's and Hill's troops 
* * '■' * made the Gettysburg campaign the Illiad of the South. 
It set Hooker's army in motion for the Potomac the next day." 

And on page 173 : 

"The selection (by Stuart), of the route through Hooker's 
army was based on the theory that the conditions would be main- 
tained as they were until Stuart got through. The preservation 
of the status in Hooker's army depended on Lee. At that time 
the design was perfectly practicable ; his army corps were sepa- 
rated by many miles." 

And he further says on page 179: 

"If Longstreet and Hill had rested one day longer in the Shen- 
andoah A'alley, Hooker ^vould have done the same, and Stuart 
would not have found the roads blockaded by his (Hooker's) 
column, marching to the Potomac. Early on the evening of the 
25 th Stuart would have crossed and bivouacked for the night 
at Seneca." 

And again on Page 192: 

"If Longstreet and Hill had stayed quiet a day longer Stuart 
would have crossed the Potomac in advance of Hooker's army 
early in the evening of the 25th, and the fate of the Confederate 
cause might have been different. There was no pressing neces- 
sity for the movement." 

General Lee did regard the movement of Longstreet and Plill 
as a pressing necessity, for he says in his first report: "By the 
24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest 
of the army should be in supporting distance." 

From the above quotations it would appear that Col. ]\Iosby 
holds General Lee responsible for the failure at Gettysburg, be- 
cause he ordered Longstreet and Hill to cross the Potomac "pre- 
maturely," and thereby set Hooker's army in motion, Avhich de- 
layed Stuart's crossing at Seneca two days ; but Stuart knew they 
were moving before it was too late to change the route he had 
selected. 

The only ground upon which the advance of Longstreet and 
Hill could be regarded as premature is that it put the Federal 



15 

army in motion and delayed Stuart's crossing of the Potomac; 
and if that made the Gettysburg campaign "the Illiad of the 
South," it must have been because of the absence of Stuart's 
cavalry ana lack of information; but Mosby elsewhere repeat- 
edly denies that it was the absence of the cavalry that caused 
the failure at Gettysburg. He goes so far as to say (on page 
i8o) : "It would have been far better if the orders had been 
less rigid and Stuart been given discretion to operate independ- 
ently of the main army." Furthermore he claims that Hill and 
Heth should bear the blame because they precipitated the battle 
by an unexpected collision with the enemy. This might have been 
avoided if they had been informed of the movements of the Fed- 
eral army^ of which they were ignorant because the cavalry was 
absent. 

There is nothing in either order to Stuart, or in General Lee's 
letter to General Ewell, of June 22nd, that justifies Col. Mosby 's 
inference that Stuart was "to move to Pennsylvania and join 
Ewell on the Susquehanna," or to justify his statement on page 
180: 

"Lee had informed Stuart that he would find Ewell on the Sus- 
quehanna. Stuart obeyed orders, and on the morning of the 
28th, moved in that direction." 

The reason why General Stuart availed of the discretion al- 
lowed him to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge will, I 
think, be found in CoJ. Mosby's Book (pages 76, yy, 78, 79), 
where he says : 

"I pointed out to Stuart the .opportunity to strike a damaging 
blow, and suggested to him to crqss the Bull Run Mountains 
and pass through the muidlc of Hooker's army into Maryland. 
* * * * He could pass the Bull Run Mountains early in the 
morning and cross the Potomac early in the evening. * * * * 

"When I got back from my trip inside Hooker's lines with my 
drove of mules, Stuart told me that General Lee was anxious 
to know if Hooker's army was moving to cross the Potomac. 
He did not ask me to go. but I volunteered to return and find 
out for him. With two men I recrossed the mountain on the 
path where I had been bushwhacked the day before ; and on 



16 

the morning of June 23, was again riding between the camps of 
the different corps in Fairfax and Loudoun. All was quiet, there 
was no sign of a movement. Hooker was waiting for Lee. * * The 
camps of the different corps were so far apart that it was easy 
to ride between them. After gathering the information General 
Lee wanted, I turned my face late in the afternoon to the Bull 
Run Mountain. . . Reynolds with the first Corps was at Guilford, 
about two miles off; the third corps (Sickles), was at Gum 
Springs about the same distance in another direction ; Avhile 
Meade's corps and the cavalrv were six or eight miles awav at 
Aldie." 

He says on page 81 : 

"I got to Stuart early the next morning. He listened to what 
I told him, wrote a dispatch, sent off a courier to General Lee. 
* * * * The information was that Hooker's army was still rest- 
ing in the camps where it had been for a week." 

And again, on pages 169 and 170, June 24th: 

"Stuart was anxiously waiting to hear what Hooker was doing. 
He must then have received General Lee's order of 5 P. M., 
of the 23rd, * * * I told him that Hooker was quiet, waiting 
on Lee." 

"After hearing my report. Stuart wrote a letter to General 
Lee — the most of it at my dictation — giving him the information 
I had brought." 

The information obtained by Col. ]\Iosby on the 23rd and 
communicated to General Stuart on the morning of June 24th, 
after he had received the second letter from General Lee, dated 
June 23rd, giving him permision to cross the Potomac east of 
the Blue Ridge, proTidcd he could do so zcitJwut hindrance, no 
doubt influenced him to cross at Seneca instead of Shepherds- 
town, for Hooker's army had then made no movement north- 
ward ; and he believed that by crossing at Seneca he would lose 
no time in getting into the position assigned him on Ewell's 
right ; but at the critical moment Llooker's movement toward 
the Potomac began, and delayed Stuart's crossing of the river 
two davs. Thus it occurred that when he entered ALiryland on 



17 

the night of the 27th, the whole of the Federal army was also 
in Maryland, and communication with General Lee was cut off; 
for, as Mosby says, Pleasanton's cavalry, which was the rear 
guard of the Federal army, crossed the Potomac at Edwards' 
Ferry at the same time that General Stuart crossed at Seneca, 
Ewell was by that time at Carlisle, and Longstreet's and Hill's 
corps were also in Pennsylvania at Chambersburg, having, as 
General Lee says, advanced so far without any report that the 
Federal army had crossed the Potomac. 

General Lee says in his second report that General Stuart 
was directed to lose no time in placing his command on the 
right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving 
northward. He might have said that Stuart was authorized to 
cross the Potomac and join with Ewell in his advance with- 
out waiting for the enemy to move northward ; for Ewell's right 
was the place assigned to him at the time Ewell's advance was 
ordered. There was no uncertainty about his instructions to take 
position on Ewell's right and guard his Hank, for they were re- 
iterated whether he crossed the Potomac at Shephcrdstown, as 
General Lee suggested, or elsewhere. That was the essential 
point of his instructions, and General Lee had the right to expect 
that they would be carried out. 

Stuart knew he was expected to be on Ewell's right and in- 
tended to be there. His report as published by Col. Mosby, 
states the causes of his delay in getting into position, (pages 
176, 177 and 178) : 

"Accordingly, three days rations were prepared and on the 
night of the 24th, the following brigades — Hampton's, Fitz Lee's 
and W. H. F. Lee's — rendezvoused secretly near Salem Depot. 
* * At one o'clock at night the brigades, with noiseless march, 
moved out. * * Moving to the right we passed through Glasscock's 
Gap without difficulty and marched for Haymarket. * * As we 
neared Haymarket, we found Hancock's corps en route through 
Haymarket for Gum Springs, his infantry well distributed through 
his trains. I chose a good position and opened with artillery on 
his passing column with effect, scattering men, wagons and 
horses in wild confusion ; disabled one of the enemy's caissons. 



18 

which he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in order 
of battle to compel us to desist. * * I sent a dispatch to General 
Lee concerning Hooker's movements and moved back to Buck- 
land to deceive the enemy." 

From this it appears that at the very outset of his enterprise, 
General Stuart encountered such a "hindrance" as General Lee 
anticipated might occur if he tried to pass through Hooker's 
army, but he did not then abandon his own plans and adopt 
General Lee's suggestion to cross the Potomac at Shepherds- 
town ; for as ]^Iosby says (page i//) : 

"He made a wide detour through Fairfax and crossed the 
Potomac the night of the 27th at Seneca, and went into bivouac 
on the ]\Iaryland shore. On the same night Pleasanton's cav- 
alry corps, the rear-guard of the army, crossed ten or twelve 
miles above on the pontoon at Edwards' Ferry, and marched on 
to Frederick." 

If Stuart had crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 
25th, as suggested by General Lee, he would have been in posi- 
tion on General Ewell's right on the 26th of June, on which date 
the two columns of the Second Corps left Chambersburg, going 
towards the Susquehanna and General Lee arrived at that place. 
(See page 115). 

If he had crossed at Seneca on the 25th. as he expected to do 
before Hooker's army moved, he might still have had time "to 
move over to Fredericktown," as indicated by General Lee ; but 
when he had crossed the Potomac on the 27th, it was too late 
to go to Fredericktown, and Ewell's movement had so far pro- 
gressed that it was too late for Stuart to join him en route to 
the Susquehanna. The only thing that was then left for him to do 
was to go on to Dover, where he had reason to believe he would 
find Ewell's corps. Unfortunately he was again too late, for 
before he got to Dover, looking for the column that General Lee 
said would probably move by Emmittsburg, both columns of 
Ewell's corps had been withdrawn and General Lee was con- 
centrating his army for the battle of Gettysburg. 

It is a pleasure to concur with Col. iNIosby, when he says, on 
page 59: 



19 

"As the Chief of Cavalry of an army — as a commander of out- 
post service in masking his own side and unmasking the other — 
Stuart never had an equal." 

General Lee knew this from past experience, and for that very 
reason felt more keenly the absence of Stuart and his cavalry 
when they were most needed in the Gettysburg campaign, to 
mask the movements of his army, and keep him informed of 
every movement of the enemy. 



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